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Anglo-Saxon versus European Social. models of European
economies
Argument by caricature?
Briefing prepared by the European Movement Senior Expert group
Ahead of the informal EU summit at Hampton Court on Thursday, 27th Oct 2005 the European Movement Senior Expert group has issued a briefing on European economic and social models. The UK Presidency of the EU has made the issue of European economic reform one of its key priorities. The briefing paper seeks to debunk the popular myth that there are two wholly distinct, competing economic models within the EU – the "Anglo Saxon" and "European Social".
Looking at key economic indicators from various EU member states, the paper states that, while EU member states are a patchwork of different economic and social models, "the economies of EU member states said to be "Anglo-Saxon" or "European Social" are aligned to a far greater degree than these generalisations acknowledge." It concludes that:
"The idea of two absolutely distinct "Anglo-Saxon" and "European Social" models within the European Union does not stand up to scrutiny. The EU’s approach to facing to the challenges of globalisation would be better served without recourse to such caricatures."
The Senior Experts group is made up of former senior civil servants, including British permanent representatives to the European Union.
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It is often suggested that there are two wholly separate and
competing economic models evident
within the European Union: the .Anglo-Saxon. model of liberal
markets, flexible labour laws and
limited government spending; and the .European Social. model
built around welfare protection, high
governmental public spending and inflexible labour markets.
This
alleged distinction has been used
by those on both sides of the argument to portray a schism
between the economies of - to borrow
another caricature -.old Europe. (or even Europe.) that are
deemed to be ailing or failing, and
those of - new Europe - such as Britain, Ireland and the new
Eastern European member states, that
are deemed to be flourishing because of the liberal free market
values that drive them.
This sharply defined 'either or' approach to the EU.s economic
future is neither helpful nor
accurate. The challenges of globalisation will not be met by
debating whether one identical economic
model is desirable or viable for all EU member states.
Pigeonholing particular countries or groups of
countries as advocates of liberalism or protectionism ignores
the fact that all EU member states agree
on the need for economic reform. As recently as the March 2005
European Council, every EU head
of government agreed a number of measures to speed up
implementation of the Lisbon Agenda,
which aims to make the EU economy the most competitive in the
world by 2010. These included steps to improve research and development within the EU; to
develop the single market in services;
to reduce State aid and to increase competition; to reduce the
regulatory burden on business; and to
support small and medium-sized enterprises.
However, the image of an EU divided by the economies of its
members has undoubtedly become a
powerful tool for those seeking to disparage both the European
Union and particular member states,
namely Germany, France and Britain. This technique is
particularly evident in UK media coverage
of domestic political affairs of these countries. In France, the
Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, is
depicted as the standard bearer for the type of liberalism
Britain is alleged to want to instil across the
whole of the EU. By contrast, President Chirac and Prime
Minister, Dominic de Villepin, are seen to
embody a staid, protectionist economic methodology in need of
some British-style liberalisation.
These are caricatures, yet ones undoubtedly fuelled by President
Chirac, who recently condemned
the economic vision of unlimited free markets 'as bad as communism'.
Likewise, in the recent coverage of the German election, the
incoming Chancellor Angela Merkel
was portrayed as the antidote to the economic sclerosis brought
about by the 'Old Europe' economic
policies of the outgoing Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder.
The Sun
notably carried a commentary piece
accusing the German public of being a .sick patient that
wouldn.t take their medicine because they
had not voted in Merkel outright. Again, this is a gross
over-simplification, yet the outgoing
Chancellor.s comments earlier this year are equally divisive and
misleading:
"There is a special European social model to protect that has
developed on the continent," Schroeder
said in June, adding: ."Those who want to destroy this model due
to national egotism or populist
motives do a terrible disservice to the desires and rights of
the next generation."
Two models?
The economies of EU member states said to be .Anglo-Saxon. or
.European Social. are aligned to a
far greater degree than these generalisations acknowledge. Any
attempt to regard the Anglo-Saxon. and US models as homogenous is also particularly
misleading. All EU economies share the
common features of governmental intervention to improve equity
of income and opportunity via the
existence of pension systems, health and long-term care, social
protection for the poor and disabled
and the redistributive function of taxation. Two particular
aspects of the US model are anathema to
any perceived European model: the lack of a national health
service and the absence of a credible
safety net for those out of work.
It is also important to note that in the World Economic Forum.s
annual study of global
competitiveness, Finland heads the league table with Sweden and
Denmark at positions three and
four. According to the WEF, all the Eastern European states,
apart from Estonia, are less
competitive than France or Germany. The Nordic model involves a
high degree of state support for
those out of work combined with greater flexibility for
employers to hire and fire.
Also significant is that the supposedly ailing .European Social.
German economy is currently
running a trade surplus of $157 billion whilst the UK has
Europe.s largest trade deficit. Germany
exported $900bn worth of goods exported last year, by far the
highest in the world, including the US
and China. The slight economic upturn apparent in Germany is
undoubtedly due to this strong export
base.
GDP and public spending
Bloated public spending is often seen as a key fault of the
.European Social. model. Britain's social
welfare spending is, at 22% of GDP, lower than that of Germany
and France (27-29%), according to
the OECD. However, the Nordic economies all fall within this
Franco-German 27-29% band, and,
significantly, British social welfare spending remains well
ahead of that of the US, which accounts
for only 15% of GDP.
Public spending in total amounts to 44% of GDP in Britain, only
a little less than in Germany (47%),
according to Commission figures. UK public spending is also on
the rise in contrast to the Eurozone where it is falling. Although the 'European Social.
model' French state budget accounts
for well over half of its GDP (54%), and the 'Anglo-Saxon' Irish
only 35%, there is not great
divergence across the EU25 from the Eurozone average (48%).
Poland, one of the key Eastern
European economies said to be aligned with liberal British
thinking, has a public spending rate
higher than the Eurozone average.
The UK budget has in fact moved from a big surplus (almost 4% of
GDP in 2000) into a deficit of
3.2% in 2004-05, resulting in a rebuke from the Commission last
month for breaching the 3% limit
required under the EU's Growth and Stability pact (although as a
non-Eurozone country Britain will
not face any economic sanctions).
Unemployment and labour markets
The key indicator that underpins the argument of those
postulating the dichotomy is that of
unemployment. It is regularly quoted in relation to both
individual economies and the policies of
the EU as a whole that current economic thinking is failing
because 20 million people are
unemployed within it. Although there are signs of some
convergence, France and Germany (both
9.6%) have unemployment rates twice that of the UK (4.6%), with
this disparity put down to the
greater opportunity afforded to workers from groups such as
women, young and older people and
unskilled workers - the flexibility of labour markets advocated
by Britain. The difficulties of hiring
and firing, though apparent in most member states, are
particularly acute in France and Germany,
where this inflexibility is believed to be increasingly
discouraging inward investment. Former Dutch
premier Wim Kok.s 2004 report regarding the progress of the
Lisbon Agenda was also scathing
about this inflexibility. It is important to note, however, that
different methods of calculating
unemployment may be partly responsible for the giving the
impression that some countries have a
greater problem of joblessness than others.
A basis for debate?
The idea of two absolutely distinct .Anglo-Saxon. and .European
social. models within the
European Union does not stand up to scrutiny. The EU.s approach
to facing up to the challenges of
globalisation would be better served without recourse to such
caricatures.
October 2005